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BRUCE M. KRAMER*

Modern Applications of the Rule
Against Perpetuities to Oil and Gas
Transactions: What the Duke of
Norfolk Didn't Tell You
ABSTRACT
The venerable Rule Against Perpetuitieshas been plaguingproperty
lawyersfor over 300 years. Oil and gas attorneys need to know the
types of transactionswhich are covered by the Rule because as John
Chipman Gray once said, the Rule is to be remorselessly applied to
void interests which vest orfail to vest within a life in being plus
twenty one years. The authorgives the oil and gas attorney a short
historical view of the development of the Rule, followed by the
generally accepted reasons that underlie the Rule's long life. The
author then analyzes the major types of transactionswhich have
run into Rule difficulties. Finally, the authorsuggests that while a
number of authoritieshave argued that the Rule should not apply
to 'commercial' transactions,such as many oil and gas transactions,
he concludes that the Rule should be applied in those situations
where the purpose of the Rule in preventing remotely vesting
interestsfrom taking mineral estates out of the stream ofcommerce
will be achieved.
I. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
As every first year law student knows, Professor John Chipman
Gray provided the classic statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities
(hereinafter the Rule): "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest."1 It reflects, along with a number of other property rules, a clash

* Maddox Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.A., University of
California at Los Angeles, 1968; J.D., University of California School of Law, 1972; LLM.,
University of Illinois College of Law, 1975.
1. JoHN OHPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPuiJmEs 201 (4th ed. 1942). Professor
Gray has been described as a "towering figure[s] of American property law. JEssE
DuKwEmI
&JAMm E. nk, PROi'mir' 288 (3d ed. 1993). Although Professor Gray is known
today for his tome on the Rule, his first property text railed against the judicial approval of
the spendthrift trust. JOHN CkwmN GRAY, REmSI'RAIN

ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (Ist

ed. 1883). While courts have warmly embraced the validity of the spendthrift trust, Professor
Gray's views on the Rule are still widely quoted and accepted.
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between the landed interests and the courts regarding the free alienability
of land. Prior to the Duke of Norfolk's Case in 1681, court decisions almost
always tended to make land more alienable and restricted the ability of the
landed families to restrict future generations in their use and alienation of
the land.4 What probably triggered the development of the Rule was the
court's acceptance of two types of indestructible future interests, namely the
executory interest and the shifting use.'
In a decision reminiscent of recent Ping-Pong decisions of the Texas
Supreme Court," Lord Chancellor Nottingham was dealing with a trust
indenture designed to protect a landed family from the consequences of the
insanity of the oldest son of the patriarch of the family. As summarized by
Professor Gray, the land was conveyed to trustees for a long term for B, the
second son and the heirs of his body, but if A, the oldest son, should die
without male issue during the life of B, or if the title should descend to B,
the trust was to be for the benefit of C, a third son. A died without issue in
the life of B. The issue was whether the shifting executory interest to C was
valid.7 Nottingham was sensitive of the desires of the patriarch to deal with
the problems insofar as his living relatives were concerned. But in
discussing the ability of the patriarch to control future interests which had
recently been found to be indestructible, the Lord Chancellor said:
Now the ultimum quod sit, or the utmost limitation of a fee
upon a fee, is not plainly determined, but it will be soon
found out, if men shall set their wits on work to contrive by
contingencies, to do that which the law has so long labored

RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 759 (1996).
3. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch.Cas. 1, 22 ENG.REP. 931 (Ch. 1681).
4. For example in D'Arundel's Case, Bracton NB 1054 (1225) the term "and his heirs"
was treated as words of limitation, not words of purchase so that the hereditament could be
transferred without the consent of the heirs.
5. Both of these interests are now called executory interests. Manning's Case, 8 Co. Rep.
,94b, 77 ENG. REP. 618 (KB 1609) sustained an executory interest in a chattel real while Pells
2.

v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 ENG. REP. 504 (1620) sustained the validity of a shifting use. See
generally, David A. Thomas (ed.), Thompson on Real Property,§ 28.01 (1994).
6. See generally, POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 2, 760 [2). The original opinion was
given by Lord Chancellor Nottingham in January, 1681. Three distinguished justices opposed
Nottingham's opinion and a rehearing was granted. Again there was a disagreement with

Nottingham continuing to adhere to his original opinion. Shortly after the rehearing,
however, Nottingham died and was replaced as Lord Chancellor by the former Lord Chief
Justice North who had disagreed with Nottingham's decision. The Nottingham decision was
reversed. Appeal to the House of Lords was delayed until 1685. North presided over the
hearing where he was opposed by Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys, a long-time and ardent
opponent. Jeffreys apparently carried the day and persuaded the House of Lords to reinstate
the Nottingham opinion over North's strong objection. Herbert Barry, The Duke of Norfolk's
Case, 23 VA. L. REv. 538 (1937).
7. See GIRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, supra note 1, § 169.
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against, the thing will make itself evident, where it is
inconvenient, and God forbid, but that mischief should be
obviated and prevented!
This mischief or inconvenience was referred to as a perpetuity
which would only be valid if the contingency or limitation was to occur or
not occur within a life in being. Since the transfer to C would occur or not
occur upon the death of A and B,both lives in being, the transfer was found
to be valid.
After a series of cases spanning some 150 years, the most important
being Thellusson v. Woodford,' the generally accepted present day concept
of a life in being plus 21 years plus a period of gestation was developed. It
also became clear that the courts were greatly concerned with the effect on
alienability in their decisions creating the life in being plus 21 years limit.
The House of Lords in Thellusson said:
But when the true reason for circumscribing the period,
during which alienation may be suspended, is adverted to,
there seems to be no ground or principle, that renders such an
ingredient necessary. The principle is the avoiding of a public
evil by placing property for too great a time out of commerce.
The length of time will not be greater or less, whether the
lives taken have any interest vested or contingent, or have
not.'0
This concern with alienability or "inconvenient fettering" cannot be
said to have been one that has existed since the beginning of common law
property principles." After all, the statute De Donis Conditionalibus which
was enacted in 1285 stood for almost 200 years as authorizing the creation
of a fee tail estate in perpetuity. 2 The common law courts did little to
ameliorate the fettering of estates in land which undoubtedly greatly
restricted the efficient use of land.
Recent commentators and historians of the Rule have developed a
more complex series of societal reasons for the Rule's staying power over

8. Duke of Norfolk's Case, supranote 3.
9. 11 Vesey 112, 32 ENG. REP. 1030 (Ch. 1805).
10. PowELL & ROHAN, supra note 2, 1 762 [2]n.13. The court also announced: "The rule
allowing any number of lives in being, a reasonable time for gestation, and twenty-one
years, is now the dear law, that has been settled and followed for ages; and we cannot shake
that rule without shaking the foundations of the law." 4 Vesey 319 (Ch. 1798).
11. RESrATEaEWOF PROPERTY 2129 (1944) suggests that "courts have manifested strong
belief in the importance to society of imposing restrictions upon attempted fetterings of
property.f The Second Restatement, however, notes that after De Donis the courts were not
necessarily wedded to a notion of free alienability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY:

DONATiVE TRANSFERS 6 (1983).
12.

POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 2, at

762.
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the years. The First Restatement of Property identified the following three
purposes of the Rule:
the rule against perpetuities provides an adjustment or
balance between the desire of the current owner of property
to prolong indefinitely into the future his control over the
devolution and use thereof and the desire of the person who
will in the future become the owner of the affected land or
other thing, to be free from the dead hand.
In the second place, the rule against perpetuities
contributes to the probable utilization of the wealth of society.
This contribution is made in two different ways. By
prohibiting certain categories of uncertain future interests,
this rule minimizes the fear of loss of investment normally felt
by the owner of a present interest subject to an outstanding
future interest. The rule against perpetuities facilitates the
utilization of the wealth of society in still another way, as a
means "for forwarding the circulation of property." This it
does by prohibiting those categories of future interests which
would make either impossible or improbable, sales of land for
long periods of time.
In the third place, the rule against perpetuities aids in
the keeping of property responsive to the meeting of the
exigencies of its current owners. The division of ownership
into successive interests tends to lessen the sum realizable
upon a sale of the separated interests, and thus diminishes the
total purchasing power of the wealth represented by the thing
in which such divided interests have been created. '3
It is against this background that the Rule must be analyzed where
oil and gas transactions are concerned. Oil and gas jurisprudence has
gained much from its inclusion within the pantheon of property law.14
While courts have struggled with, and on occasion ignored, the application
of the Rule to certain types of oil and gas transactions, it is the rare court
which throws off the yoke of 375 years of common law Rule developments

13. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 2129-31. Similar purposes were
attributed to the Rule by Professor Casner who was the reporter of the Restatement (Second)
of Property. He stated: "From this review of diverse purposes served by the rule against
perpetuities, it is fair to conclude that the social interest in preserving property from
excessive interference with its alienability rests partly upon the necessities of maintaining
a going society controlled primarily by its living members, partly upon the social desirability
of facilitating the utilization of wealth, and partly upon the social desirability of keeping
property responsible to the current exigencies of its current beneficial owners."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSE

10

(1983). See generally, Lewis

Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities,103 U. PA. L. REv. 707 (1955).
14. See generally, Bruce Kramer, Property and Oil and Gas Don't Mix: The Mangling of
Common Law PropertyConcepts, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 540, 541 (1994) [hereinafter "Mangling"].
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and agrees with Professors Williams and Meyers that the Rule has no place
in 'commercial' oil and gas disputes."5
II.

THE RULE AND OIL AND GAS TRANSACTIONS IN
GENERAL

A. The Oil and Gas Lease
The present day oil and gas lease did not spring sui generis from
the head of Medusa. As with most common law developments, the modem
short primary term followed by an indefinite secondary term triggered by
the production of oil or gas in paying quantities or by any number of
consensual alternatives, evolved over an extended period of time. 6 An early
Pennsylvania decision raised a red flag for Rule concerns when it held that
the title to an oil and gas lease was inchoate until such time as production
was secured. 7 Since the vesting of title would be postponed until discovery
was achieved the then recently developed "no-term" lease which followed
the initial fixed term leases might have fallen into the Rule trap. Since the
"no-term" lease did not require production within any time frame at all,
that combined with the notion that title did not vest until production was
secured might have been interpreted as the creation of a springing
executory interest which would run afoul of the Rule. But in a series of cases
in the early 1900s the courts unanimously rejected the notion that title to an
oil and gas lease does not vest immediately upon its creation, therefore
obviating any Rule problem.' West Virginia was particularly active in the
jurisprudence rejecting the application of the Rule to the "no-term" lease. 19
With the validity of the "no-term" lease firmly entrenched, it appears clear

15. PATRICK MARTIN & BRUCE KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 325
(1996)[hereinafter WILLIAS& MEYERS]. See also, W. Barton Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective:
Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REv. 721, 725-6 (1952)(where Professor Leach
also railed against the application of the Rule to modem commercial transactions). See Nantt
v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986).
16. See generally,Leslie Moses, The Evolution and Development of the Oil and Gas Lease, 2
INsr.ONOlL&GASL.&TAX'N1 (1951); A.W. Walker, The Nature of PropertyInterests Created
by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1928).
17. Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 25 A. 732 (Pa. 1893).
18. See, e.g., Becker v. Submarine Oil Co., 204 P. 245 (Ca. 1922); Uoyd's Estate v. Mullen
Tractor & Equip. Co., 4 So.2d 282 (Miss. 1941); Rosson v. Bennett, 294 S.W. 660 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927); Thaw v. Gaffney, 83 S.E. 983 (W. Va. 1915).
19. See Todd v. Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co., 110 S.E. 446 (W. Va. 1922); Johnson
v. Armstrong, 94 S.E. 753 (W. Va. 1918); Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 83 S.E. 1075 (W. Va.

1915).
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that the modem lease is likewise insulated from Rule problems." While
there may have been some doubt as to the inapplicability of the Rule to the
primary/secondary term lease in Georgia at one time, a recent decision
finding no Rule problem with a mining lease for a term of 50 years "and for
such longer time after such term has ended as Said Minerals are Produced
from the Leased Land" has resolved that doubt in favor of not applying the
Rule.'
B. Options To Renew Leases
The application of the Rule to options of indeterminate length
dealing with the conveyance or reconveyance of an interest in real property
has been the subject of substantial controversy. Professor Gray argued that
the English precedents clearly applied the Rule to these types of options
based on the fact that the option gave the owner an equitable interest in the
real property.' Some courts disdain the purist approach and apply a
balancing approach to determine if the Rule's policy against the fettering
the free use of property is outweighed by other considerations of public
concern and welfare.' But for the most part courts find that the Rule should
be applied to options to purchase or re-purchase real property.24

20. As one might expect there are no Rule cases dealing with the modern type of oil and
gas lease. There was a mining lease with a similar short primary and secondary term feature
where the court found that the lease did not violate the Rule. Aikens v. Nevada Placer, Inc.,
13 P.2d 1103 (Nev. 1932).
21. The earlier decision, Brown v. Mathis, 41 S.E.2d 137 (Ga. 1947) found that a
reservation of the right to mine sand, to be paid at the royalty rate of $ .10/carload when
removed violated the Rule because it was treated as an option to purchase in gross. The later
decision, Parker v. Reynolds Metals Co., 747 F.Supp. 711 (M.D.Ga. 1990) upheld the 50 year

primary term and so long thereafter as minerals are produced as being a perpetual lease, not
a perpetual option.
22. GRAY, supra note 1, at §§ 275, 275.1,330 (analyzing London & W.R.R.Co. v. Gonum,
20 Ch. D. (C.A.) 562 and Winsor v. Mills, 32 N.E. 352 (Mass. 1892)).
23. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. Philadelphia Transit Co., 233 A.2d 15,

19 (Pa. 1967).
24. See, e.g., Roundtree v. Richardson, 108 So.2d 152 (Ala. 1959); Mattem v. Herzog, 367
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1963); Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 119 S.E. 89 (Va. 1923). See also
Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.), cert denied,355 U.S. 907
(1957). In Greenshields the application of the Rule to a gas purchase contract which entitled

the buyer to all of the gas which may be produced or hereafter acquired by the seller was
rejected. The assertion was that the reference to gas that may be acquired essentially gave
the buyer an option which would not meet the Rule requirements. The court, relying in part
on Oklahoma's status as a non-ownership jurisdiction, concluded that the Rule should not

apply since the interest was vested when the contract was executed and would otherwise
interfere with the development of oil and gas resources. Id.
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Notwithstanding this general rule regarding options, a perpetual
option to renew an oil and gas lease was found to be valid.'6 Similar results
were reached in the analogous situation of the "no-term" lease which gave
26
the lessee the perpetual right to renew the lease through a rental payment.
In Epstein v. Zahloute," the court in dictum found that a perpetual option to
renew found in an oil and gas lease would not violate the rule because the
oil and gas lease itself was an "estate in real property." The court attempted
to distinguish perpetual options to renew in ordinary leases which it found
void under the Rule. The distinction made by the Epstein court seems
difficult to understand and might not apply in the many jurisdictions which
apply the same doctrines and rules to oil and gas leases that they do for
ordinary leases. Is there a difference between an ordinary lease giving the
lessee the option to renew forever by the payment of the rental and an oil
and gas lease providing for the same type of renewal. A Canadian court
saw no difference and concluded that an option to renew an oil and gas
lease was void for violating the Rule since it could be exercised for a period
in excess of a life in being plus twenty-one years.'
Although not involving an option to renew a lease, the recent
Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Temple Hoyne Buell Foundation v.
Holland & Hart, is instructive of the problems oil, gas and mineral
conveyancers run into when they ignore the Rule. The defendant law firm
represented the plaintiffs in connection with the sale of stock in Kings
County Development Corp. (KCDC) to John Rocovich. The attorneys
drafted an option contract as part of that transaction which allegedly gave
the plaintiffs an option to purchase a portion of the mineral estate then
owned by KCDC should KCDC ever distribute the mineral estate to its
shareholders. KCDC instituted several lawsuits against various parties
including the Foundation and Rocovich claiming they had breached their
fiduciary duties to KCDC. The Foundation eventually settled with KCDC
and agreed to receive only 1/2 of the mineral estate it would have been
entitled to had the option contract been followed. KCDC had urged in the
litigation that the option violated the Rule, but because the case was settled
no definitive ruling had been reached. At that point the Foundation sued its
former lawyers who drafted the option contract for legal malpractice.
The jury had found that the defendants had committed malpractice
by creating an option that violated the Rule." The court of appeals

25. Becker v. Submarine Oil Co., 204 P. 245 (Cal.App. 1921).
26. See cases cited supra, note 19.
27. 222 P.2d 318 (Cal. App. 1950).
28. Canadian Export Gas & Oil Ltd. v. Flegal, 80 D.L.R.3d 679, (1978) 1 W.W.R. 185
(Alta.S.Ct., Trial Div. 1977).
29. 851 P.2d 192 (Colo.App. 1992, cert. denied).
30. Id. at 194.
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disagreed, while noting that an option to purchase may under certain
circumstances be subject to the Rule. Options will be subject to the Rule
where they "fetter" the property interest which is the subject matter of the
option for a period in violation of the Rule. 31 Here there was no real
property interest that was directly fettered by the option since Rocovich
lacked any interest in the mineral estate until such time as the minerals were
distributed to the shareholders. But even though the option was found not
to violate the Rule, the defendant lawyers were not off the hook. The court
said:
Thus, although we hold here that the option did not violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities, the question remains whether
defendants, as reasonably prudent attorneys, should have
foreseen that the option, as drafted, was likely to result in
litigation and whether other attorneys, in similar circumstances, would have taken steps to prevent such a result.32
Here the defendant attorney admitted that he had given no specific
consideration to the Rule in drafting the agreement. Because factual issues
existed regarding what the duty of a reasonable attorney would have been
to at least research the Rule to see if it might apply, the court33 remanded the
case back to the trial court for a second trial on the merits.
C. Defeasible Term Interests
The defeasible term interest at first blush seems to be the "ugly
duckling" of the mineral interest.' Apparently favored by federal land
banks unloading their previously foreclosed lands, these interests in the
hands of a careless drafter may create significant Rule problems. A simple
hypothetical shows the nature of the problem. Olga owns a fee simple
absolute in the surface and mineral estate known as Techacre. She conveys
the surface estate and of the mineral estate to Alice in fee simple absolute.
As to the other 1/2 mineral estate, Olga reserves them for herself for a period

Id. at 195-96. See generally POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 2, 767B (1996).
32. Id. at 198.
33. The court clearly suggested, however, that an attorney would be guilty of
malpractice if he(a) did not research the issue of the Rule in the context of this transaction,
(b) failed to consider the potential for a dispute over the applicability of the Rule to the
option, and (c) failed to utilize a savings clause to protect against that potential dispute." 851
P.2d at 199. Thus merely because the attorney did not actually violate the Rule in the
drafting of the instrument would not insulate him from a malpractice action if the plaintiff
reasonably settled a potential dispute regarding the Rule and received less than he would
have otherwise had not the dispute arisen.
34. For a more complete view of the Rule as it applies or does not apply to defeasible
term interests, see Mangling,supranote 14, at 550-57.
31.
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of twenty years and so long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying
quantities. Applying first year property principles, Olga has retained a fee
simple subject to an executory limitation in the 1/2 mineral interests and has
conveyed to Alice an executory interest. Alice's interest is an executory
interest because it is a future interest created in someone other than the
grantor that will become possessory by the divesting of a prior freehold
estate held by another person.' Since the executory interest may or may not
vest or fail to vest within a life in being plus 21 years, the conveyance to
mineral interest should be void. That
Alice of a future interest in the
would lead to the anomalous result that Olga who purported to reserve
something less than a fee simple absolute in the mineral interest has
reserved just such an interest.
Olga could have easily achieved her objective of reserving a
defeasible term interest by utilizing two instruments. If she would have
conveyed the entire fee simple absolute to Alice and then have Alice reconvey back to her the 20 year plus production mineral interest no Rule
problem would have arisen. That is because the interest created in Olga by
the Alice/Olga deed is a fee simple determinable with Alice reserving a
possibility of reverter. As we all know, while a possibility of reverter is a
contingent future interest, it is for historically anomalous reasons not subject
to the Rule?6 Yet courts have in recent times come to the rescue of grantors,
grantees and their attorneys who fail to use the double deed method to
protect themselves against the Rule.
The early cases, however, were not so kind to the drafters. In an
analogous non-oil and gas case, the New York Court of Appeals concluded
that a grantor who conveyed the surface estate but who reserved a certain
plot and lime kiln for "so long as said lime kiln is occupied and used for the
purpose of burning lime," had violated the Rule. 37 This early case was
followed by Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., where the grantor excepted
and reserved all minerals "for a period of twenty (20) years, and so long
thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals may or shall be produced therefrom
in paying quantities."39 The California Supreme Court first concluded that
its constitutional perpetuities provision was the equivalent of the common
law Rule, since this grant had antedated the statutory adoption of the Rule.
The court also rejected the modem approach of treating the grantor's
interest as a reserved interest and thus subject to the common law regrant

35.

See generally CORNELIUS MOYNiHAN, INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

178-80,190-92 (2d ed. 1988).
36. LEWIS SIMES & ALLAN F. SMirrH, THE LAW OF FuruE INTEIRI, M §§ 1236,1239 (2d ed.
1956); THOMAS E. ATKINSON, ET AL. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.1 at 7 n.3 (1952).
37. Walker v. Marcellus & O.L. Ry Co., 123 N.E. 736 (N.Y. 1919).
38. 270 P.2d 604 (Cal. App. 1954).
39. Id. at 606-7.
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fiction.' While criticized by some leading authorities," it is clear that the
court's lengthy discussion of the Rule and its application to the conveyed
interest set forth a warning shot across the bow of the ship for those who
ignored the Rule.
While Victory Oil placed California lawyers on notice about
potential Rule problems, the California Supreme Court less than four years
later muddied the waters in Brown v.Terra Bella Irrigation District.' In
Brown the grantor reserved the minerals "for a period of 25 years and as
long thereafter as oil or gas or petroleum products or minerals shall be
produced from said property in paying quantities."" There was an
additional clause that created some confusion. That clause said:
Subject to the reservations and conditions aforesaid, [grantor]
hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys all of said real
property aforesaid, to the [grantee], together with the
tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto
belonging or appertaining, and the reversions, remainder and
remainders, rents, issues, and profits thereof."
This strange sounding legalese confounded the Supreme Court so
that they did not apply the Victory Oil rationale to invalidate what was
clearly a springing executory interest.' If the Rule invalidated that
executory interest in the grantee, it would return to the grantor, only to be
instantaneously transferred back to the grantee by virtue of this strangely
worded paragraph. The court's use or misuse of the terms possibility of
reverter, reversion and remainder make the decision difficult to understand
at best. The court's conclusion that the grantor intended to convey all of his
reversionary rights to the grantee flies in the face of the express reservation
of a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. As Professor Williams
noted: "In the present state of the law, in California and elsewhere, the
careful conveyancer will avoid conveying interests subject to reserved
defeasible term interests.""
Given the choice between Victory Oil and Brown a California court
of appeals chose the Brown approach notwithstanding the grantor's express

40. See Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
41. See, e.g., Richard Maxwell, DiscussionNotes 3 Oil and Gas Rep. (MB) 124345 (Aug.
1954) and Richard Maxwell, DiscussionNotes 8 Oil and Gas Rep. (MB) 862 (June 1958).
42. 330 P.2d 775 (Cal. 1958).
43. Id. at 776.
44. Id.
45. The court inexplicably did not cite Victory Oil leaving readers in the dark as to its
continued vitality given the diametrically opposite result.
46.

WILLIAMS AND MEYERs, supra note 15, § 186.4.
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assertion of the controlling authority of Victory Oil. In Rousselot v. Spanier,47
the grantors reserved to themselves the oil and gas except it would lapse if
production wasn't achieved within 20 years and continuing thereafter. The
grantors asserted that the grantees received an executory interest that
violated the Rule. The court relied on the distinction between ownership
and non-ownership jurisdictions, namely that the oil and gas estate in
California is a profit a prendre or an incorporeal hereditament. Incorporeal
hereditaments are not estates in land. They are burdens on the corporeal or
possessory estate. Thus the grantor conveyed the full possessory estate to
the grantee, burdened by the grantor's non-possessory estate. The grantee's
interest was vested at the time the interest was created.E This use of the
corporeal/incorporeal distinction to deny the existence of common law
estates in land which would be subject to the Rule, has some support in
Gerhardv. Stephens,4 although courts in non-ownership jurisdictions have
for many years attached the estate labels to the mineral estate and oil and
gas lease.The Rousselot approach would obviously not work in an ownership
jurisdiction which treats the mineral interest as a corporeal hereditament.
Several courts have applied the fictional regrant theory that applies to
reservations to find that the Rule has not been violated where the grantor
reserves the present possessory estate.'1 The fiction operates as follows:
Historically courts treated reservations and exceptions differently.
Exceptions were never part of the grant while a reservation granted all of
the interest to the grantee with a fictional re-grant back to the grantor5 2
Thus if a defeasible term mineral interest is reserved and not excepted the
full mineral estate is conveyed to the grantee who then transfers back to the
grantor the fee simple determinable while retaining for the grantee a
possibility of reverter.

47. 131 Cal. Rptr. 438 (Cal. App. 1976). See also Stevens Mineral Co. v. State of Michigan,
418 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. App. 1987), Iv.app.den., 430 Nich. 896 (1988) where the court also did
not apply the Rule since it treated the defeasible term mineral interest as a profit a prendre
so that the granted interest in the land and minerals vested at the time the deed was
executed.
48. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 439. The court said: "The interest granted to [the grantee] was a
present possessory interest. When the grantor's interest ceases because oil and gas are no
longer found in paying quantities, the grantees are left with their estate free of that burden.
The expiration of the profit a prendre does not create a new estate in violation of the rule
against perpetuities.' Id. [footnotes omitted].
49. 442 P.2d 692 (Cal. 1968).
50. See, e.g., Callahan v. Martin, 43 P.2d 788 (Cal. 1935); Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp.,
604 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1979).
51. Earle v. International Paper Co., 429 So.2d 989 (Ala. 1983); Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627
S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
52. LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 887[5] (Rohan rev. 1982).
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There are many problems with this fictional re-grant theory. An
initial problem is the use of a fiction to reach a result that would otherwise
be barred by the Rule.' The other problem is discerning whether the
grantor excepted or reserved the defeasible term interest since most modem
deed forms use both terms in describing what the grantor is doing. The
Alabama Supreme Court was particularly frank about this intent question
when it stated:
Realistically, [the grantor) had no intent regarding any
distinction between withholding an interest and receiving the
same interest from his grantee. He would simply have
intended to convey the property while retaining limited
mineral rights by whatever form of words the lawyers said
would be effective.'
Notwithstanding that frank expression the court went on to identify
several factors which led the court to conclude that a reservation and not an
exception was intended.' The Texas court which applied the same fictional
re-grant approach also applied some canons of construction to support its
interpretation. The Texas court stated:
The rule against perpetuities is a rule of property and not one
of construction. However, the interpretation of a written
instrument or instruments is ordinarily required for
application of the rule. Where the instrument is capable of
two constructions, one of which will give effect to the whole
of the instrument, while the other would defeat it in whole or
in part, preference is given to the construction that will
uphold the instrument. '
While the canon of construction that prefers an interpretation that
gives effect to the intent of the parties is generally accepted, it must be
remembered, as the court did, that the Rule is a rule of property which by
its very nature is intent-defeating. In addition the use of a legal fiction is not
a canon of construction but a substitute for the written language of the
instrument created by the court to achieve a result that would otherwise not
occur.
The difficulty that the Alabama and Texas courts encountered
where the deed uses both "except" and "reserve" language was overcome

53. Mangling, supra note 14, at 556. "Creating a legal fiction takes something away from
the law by creating an image of outcome-oriented decisions, rather than a careful analysis
of the issues and rules raised by a particular common law doctrine." Id.
54. InternationalPaper Co., 429 So.2d at 993.
55. Mangling, supranote 14, at 556-57.
56. Bagby, 627 S.W.2d at 194.
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in Walker v. Foss.5 7 In 1946 Adams conveyed various parcels of land to her
4 children, excepting and reserving to herself all of the oil and gas for a
period for five years after her death and so long thereafter as oil and gas
was produced in paying quantities. ' A dispute arose later, after various
mesne conveyances, as to the nature of the estate that had been conveyed
to the children.
In construing the deeds to the children the court found that the
language contained therein was virtually identical to the deed language
construed in Bagby. It agreed with the rationale of Bagby, although it did not
go through the intricate analysis of whether the grantor really intended to
reserve rather than except the present possessory interest, implying that if
you apply the legal fiction you don't have to go over constructional hurdles
in order to have that fiction applied. Where the court confused the issue was
where it attempted to describe the nature of the interests created by this
instrument. As noted above, the Bagby legal fiction transforms a springing
executory interest in the grantee into a possibility of reverter. But this court
clearly labels the interest received by the grantee as a springing executory
interest. It then stated:
We recognize that the Bagby court characterized the future
interest created by the grantor's reservation of a defeasible
term interest as a possibility of reverter instead of terming it
a springing executory interest to sidestep the effect of the rule
against perpetuities. Although the rule against perpetuities is
not directly at issue here, the [Bagby] court has delineated the
interests created by reservation of a defeasible term interest.M
Then the court states that the grantor reserved "an income stream
to herself from the oil and gas underlying the property deeded.., leaving
him with a reversionary interest which vested in interest at the time the

57. Walker v. Foss, 930 S.W.2d 701,1996 WL 452957 (Tex. App. 1996).
58. The exact language of the deed provided that in addition to a life estate in the
surface reserved by the mother she:
further excepted and reserved to the grantor herein, her heirs, devisees and
assigns, all of the oil and gas (but not including any other minerals) in and
under the said premises conveyed ...the reservation of oil and gas...
shall expire at the end of five years from and after the death of the grantor
herein if at that time no oil and gas is being produced from any portion of
said land in paying quantities. If oil and gas is being produced in paying
quantities at the end of five years from the death of the grantor, then this
reservation shall expire when said production in paying quantities shall
cease. At the time of the expiration of this reservation... all of said oil and
gas not theretofore removed and all said rights appurtenant thereto shall
vest in the above named grantee and his heirs and assigns.
59. 930 S.W.2d at 705 n. 2.
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deed was executed." '° How a court can label an interest created in someone
other than the grantor as a reversionary interest is hard to understand. By
also characterizing the grantor's reservation of an income stream, rather
than the mineral estate, the court suggests that no property interest in the
oil and gas was reserved, yet it is clear that is what the deed purports to do.
The grantor owned the mineral estate and could have leased or developed
it at any time during her lifetime. In addition, her heirs could have leased
or developed the oil and gas up to five years after she died. The interest
created in the grantees is either a springing executory interest which is void
under the Rule, or is a possibility of reverter by application of the legal
fiction. It can't be a springing executory interest which vests at the time of
creation because executory interests do not vest until the conditions have
been satisfied.
The Rule was also ignored by the Wyoming Supreme Court which
did the greatest violence to common law estates doctrine when it found that
the interest created in the grantee following a defeasible fee simple was a
vested remainder and not an executory interest.6' The concurring judge
would have exempted the executory interests created by the defeasible term
interest from the application of the Rule by following the Williams &
Meyers suggestion that the Rule should not apply to certain oil and gas
transactions which serve the social and commercial convenience.'
The vast majority of litigation, however, has largely ignored the
Rule problems inherent in the reservation of a defeasible term interest.' For
example, in McLaurin v. Royalties, Inc.," the court completely ignores the
Rule problem even though the defeasible term deed was critical to the
determination of the ownership of the minerals. In other cases the court
mistakenly labels the future interest in the grantee as a possibility of
reverter, rather than an executory interest.65
The practical results of almost all of these cases is that the courts
have refused to follow the traditional doctrines relating to estates in land in
order to apply the Rule to a situation where it is clearly called for. The

60. Id.
61. Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620 (Wyo. 1983)(discussed and criticized in Mangling,
supra note 14, at 552-57).
62. 668 P.2d at 638 (Thomas, J., concurring) Justice Thomas also would have applied the
"wait and see" doctrine to determine the validity of the executory interest and if the
defeasible term did not actually last for a period of time in excess of a life in being plus 21
years, it would be valid. Since there was no production within the 20 year term period, the
executory interest did actually vest within the Rule period. 668 P.2d at 633-34.
63. See cases cited in WXLIAMS& MaYM, supra note 15, at 186.2(2) n.8.
64. 95 So.2d 105 (Miss. 1957).
65. York v. Kenilworth Oil Co., 614 S.W.2d 468,470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
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courts have accepted the following rationale proffered by Howard
Williams:
We believe that defeasible term interests serve a useful social
purpose, whether reserved or granted. The term interest, as
compared with a perpetual interest, tends to remove title
complications when the land is no longer productive of oil or
gas. This simplification of title promotes alienability of land,
which is one purpose served by the Rule against Perpetuities.
We believe, therefore, that the courts should simply exempt
interests following granted or reserved defeasible term
interests from the Rule, on the straight-forward basis that
they serve social and commercial convenience and do not
offend the policy of the Rule Against Perpetuities."
I disagree with the wholesale exemption for deeds which fail to
comply with the Rule merely because oil and gas interests are the subject of
the conveyance. Should there be an exemption for defeasible term deeds of
surface estates from the Rule? I think not. The 'hypertechnical' rule that
allows the parties to achieve the same result through the use of two deeds
should not serve as the basis for a wholesale exemption of the Rule.67
D. Royalty Interests
Oscar is the fee simple absolute owner of Raideracre. He leases to
Lobo Oil reserving a M/ath royalty. Shortly thereafter Oscar transfers to
Alexis the all of his interests except for the following reservation:
It is particularly agreed, and this conveyance is made subject
thereto, and said reservation and the terms and stipulations
hereof relative thereto, that Alexis, its successors and assigns
shall receive and be entitled to one-half the royalties payable
thereunder, and all of the reversionary rights in the minerals,
except that there is hereby reserved to Oscar, one-half (%)of
all royalties accruing and/or payable under the existing
leases, and, in the event of the termination, forfeiture or
expiration of said leases, as and when same may, respectively, sO terminate, forfeit, or expire, a perpetual nonparticipating free royalty interest in and to all the minerals, in,

66. WILUAMS & MEYERS, supra note 15, at 187.
67. Id. where the authors find the law not only hypertechnical but foolish as well for
allowing two deeds to achieve what one deed cannot. I do not believe that it is any more
foolish than the courts which apply the legal fiction relating to reservations to save a

transaction from the malpractice lawyers.
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upon, or under the lands conveyed hereby as follows: /,,th on
oil and gas.'
Does the reserved royalty interest that burdens future production
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities? The answer to that question may
depend on which state law you apply.' A recent case arising in Texas dealt
with the argument that the royalty reservation relating to future production
violated the Rule because the future royalty could not become effective until
the existing leases terminated and since those leases could extend for a
period in excess of that allowed by the Rule, the interests were void. 70 In
most states, including Texas, this argument fundamentally misconstrues the
nature of a royalty interest created outside of the oil and gas leasing
transaction.
A royalty interest is a fractional share of production free of the
expenses of production which may be created independent of a lease.' It is
a part of the mineral interest which unless otherwise reserved is conveyed
with the mineral estate. The duration of a royalty interest may be in fee
simple absolute or any of the other recognized estates in land, including a
fixed term for years." Regardless of the estate being transferred in 'future'
royalties, a number of jurisdictions have treated such transfers as violating
the Rule based on the erroneous assumption that a royalty interest is only
vested when production occurs.
The leading state that has adopted this misconception is Kansas.
Their slide down the slippery slope began with dictum in Miller v. Sooy, 3
that a conveyance of a royalty interest from production from leases not yet
in existence would violate the Rule. Since the court had previously found
that the conveyance of a royalty interest was limited to the individual
grantee, and not his heirs or assigns, that conclusion was clearly irrelevant
to the outcome of the litigation. Nonetheless, the dictum was approved by
the Kansas Supreme Court some 25 years later in Lathropv. Eyestone.74 The
grantor had previously executed an oil and gas lease on the parcel in

68. The language cited is contained in the deed interpreted by the court in Hamman v.
Bright & Co., 924 S.W.2d 168,174 (Tex.App. 1996), judg. vacated in aid ofsettlement, 938 S.W.2d
718 (rex. 1997).
69. Bruce M. Kramer, Royalty Interests in the United States: Not Cutfrom the Same Cloth,
29 TULSA L.J. 449, 451-2 (1994) [hereinafter "Royalty Interests].
70. Hariman, 924 S.W.2d at 175.
71. WILuAMS& MEYER$, supra note 15, at 1087 (1995). Royalty Interests, supra note 69, at
450.
72. Royalty Interests,supra note 69, at 451. For an example of a fixed term royalty interest
see Gavenda v. Strata Energy Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986)(one-half royalty reserved for
15 year fixed term).
73. 242 P. 140 (Kan. 1926).
74. 227 P.2d 136 (Kan. 1951).
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question. Through two separate instruments the grantor purposed to
convey fractional interests in the existing lease and in the bonus and royalty
that would occur under any future lease. The grantor also expressly
reserved the executive power to lease. The grantor conveyed his reserved
interest to the plaintiff who brought a quiet title action, asserting that the
grantee's royalty interest from future leases violated the.rule. The court
concluded:
Appellant or future fee owners might never execute another
lease. There is nothing in any of the instruments which
imposes a duty on them to do so. Moreover there is no
limitation of time within which a future lease would be
required to be executed. It is, therefore, wholly problematical
when, if ever, such an interest under future leases would vest.
Such a grant violates the rule against perpetuities, a rule
against too remote vesting. 5
This ignores the fact that a royalty interest is a vested interest. The
Rule only applies to contingent remainders and executory interests. The
free-standing royalty interest or the royalty interest that applies to future
leases is a vested interest when it is created. It is not a contingent future
interest because production might not occur for an indefinite period of time.
Nonetheless, Lathrop continues to be followed in Kansas, 6 although some

75. Id. at 143-44.
76. Cosgrove v. Young, 642 P.2d 75 (Kan. 1982). See also DAVID PIERCE, KANSAS OIL &
GAS HANDBOOK, §§ 4.15, 4.16 (1986) and Drach v. Ely, 703 P.2d 746 (Kan. 1985). A recent
decision suggests that Kansas courts are still struggling with the vesting concept of Lathrop.
In Fritschen v. Wanek, 924 P.2d 1288 (Kan. App. 1996) the testator in his will devised to his
children "an undivided one-sixty-fourth of all the Oil, Gas and other Minerals produced and
saved from the following described land prior to May 26, 1951." Id. at 1289. In 1941 the
children executed a family settlement agreement extending the grant "until April 21,1956,
and as long thereafter as oil or gas is continuously produced from these premises or any
portion thereof or said property is being continuously developed and operated." Id. at 1291.
When the will was admitted to probate and when the agreement was executed there was no
production. Under the Lathrop view that royalty interests do not vest until there is
production, one might think that these interests would violate the Rule. The court did not
focus on the issue of what was the latest period of time in which the royalty interests would
vest or fail to vest. As written the will specified a termination date within 21 years of its
becoming effective and the settlement agreement had a similar limitation. Thus, the royalty
interest would have vested or failed to vest within 21 years of a life in being since production
would have to occur prior to 1956 in order to extend the interest indefinitely. Instead the
court focused on a constructional preference to avoid Rule problems contained in Gore v.
Beren, 254 Kam 418,428-29,867 P.2d 330 (1994) and a dislike for applying the Rule to modem
business practices. What is also interesting is that the court did not mention the fact that
Kansas has adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities which changes the time
period in which an interest must vest or fail to vest. KAN.STAT.ANN. § 59-3401 et seq.
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later cases have raised some doubts as to continuing vitality.7
In California, an early case suggested that the reservation of a freestanding royalty interest payable out of future lease production would
violate the Rule. In Dallapi v. Campbell," the grantor had reserved the
executive power and the right to distribute royalties at a time when there
were no existing leases. The court did not discuss the validity of the royalty
reservation, but focused on the reservation of the executive power. Here the
court concluded that the reservation for an indefinite period of time of the
executive power violated the Rule." If you treat the executive power as a
non-vested interest until it is exercised, you are applying the same analysis
as Lathrop.Thus for a number of years, there was a substantial question as
to whether one could create a free-standing royalty interest in California.
But in Keville v. Hollister Co."8' the court determined that the executive power
vested when it becomes exercisable, not when it is actually exercised.," Thus
the Rule would not apply since the interests were vested. Applying that
rationale to the royalty situation would lead to a similar result, the royalty
interest was vested when created, not when there was actual oil and gas
production.
The leading decision that firmly rejects the Kansas approach to
royalty interests is Hanson v. Ware! 2 The deed purported to transfer a '/ 1,th
royalty interest in the existing lease and from whomever shall operate the
premises in question. The court noted both the Kansas and California
decisions before rejecting them as not persuasive. The court concluded:

77. See, e.g., Froelich v. United Royalty Co., 290 P.2d 93 (Kan. 1955), on rehearing, 297
P.2d 1106 (Kan. 1956). Froelich involved a grant of one-half of the royalty which may be

reserved by the grantor. Grantor had the exclusive executive power to lease. The term of the
grant was for 21 years and so long thereafter as oil or gas was produced in paying quantities.
The court concluded that the grantee's interest was vested and therefore the Rule did not
apply, even though Lathrop clearly would have found the royalty interest subject to the
Rule. Id. at 98.
78. 114 P.2d 646 (1941).
79. See also Lee Jones, ProblemsPresented by the Separationof the Exclusive Leasing Power
from the Ownershipof Land, Minerals,or Royalty, 2 INS.ON OIL &GASL.&TAx'N 271,289 (1951).

80.

105 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1972).

81. Id. at 239-40.
82. 274 S.W.2d 359 (Ark. 1955). For other cases adopting the Hanson reasoning see
Dauphin Island Property Owners' Ass'n v. Callon Institutional Royalty Investors, 519 So. 2d
948 (Ala. 1988); Terry v. Conway Land, Inc., 508 So.2d 401 (Fla.App. 1987); J.M. Huber Corp.
v. Square Enterprises, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 410 (Tenn.App. 1982). See also, Price v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 447 P.2d 509 (1968); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 391 P.2d 927 (Wyo. 1964). Dean
Charles Meyers criticized the Kansas approach in a well-written article which was cited
extensively in Hanson. Charles Meyers, The Effect of the Rule Against Perpetuitieson Perpetual
Non-ParticipatingRoyalty and KindredInterests,32 TEX. L. REv. 369 (1954).
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We are decidedly of the opinion that the rule against
perpetuities was not violated by the conveyance for the
reason that they acquired a present interest rather than a
future interest in the land. To treat the appellees' royalty as a
future interest involves a failure to distinguish between their
estate in real property, which is an abstract legal conception,
and the likelihood of their ultimately receiving a share in the
production of oil and gas, which is purely a practical matter.
It is plain, that under out law, the appellees acquired an
estate in land at the moment they received the deed in
question. That estate was one of absolute ownership,
although limited in extent In short, the typical contingent
remainderman has an uncertain interest in the fee simple,
while these appellees have a fee simple interest in the
uncertain.s
The key distinction between the vesting of an estate and receiving
the fruits of the royalty clearly places the free-standing royalty interest
outside of the strictures of the Rule."
It was therefore somewhat surprising when in Hamman v. Bright&
Co.," a party asserted that the royalty interest reserved using language
similar to that given at the beginning of this section violated the Rule. Their
argument was based on an extrapolation from Peveto v. Starkeys which had
concluded that the transfer of a royalty interest which was to become
effective upon the expiration of a subsisting defeasible, term royalty interest
violated the Rule. In the usual case, the transfer of a royalty interest held by
a lessor that applies to future leases or production is a transfer of a portion
of the lessor's possibility of reverter. That future interest is transferable inter
vivos under modem conveyancing doctrine and the owner of the possibility
of reverter is free to divide up the bundle of sticks that make up the future
interest just as she can divide up the bundle of sticks that make up the
present possessory mineral estate. The transfer by a lessor of a royalty
interest in future leases is a present transfer of a future interest. There is no

83. 274 S.W.2d at 362.
84. The vast majority of cases dealing with either the executive power or the freestanding royalty have presumed that the interest is valid without discussing the Rule. See,
e.g., Davis v. Mann, 234 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1956)(applying Oklahoma law); Texas Gulf
Producing Co. v. Griffith, 65 So. 2d 834 (Miss. 1953); Duval v. Stone, 213 P.2d 212 (1949);
Watkins v. Slaughter, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945). For an interesting case dealing with the transfer
of a royalty interest to a royalty pool for a period of ten years and so long thereafter as oil
or gas is produced on any of the pooled tracts, see Moffitt v. Sederlund, 378 N.W.2d 491
(Mich. App. 1985)(finding Rule not applicable).
85. 924 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App. 1996), judg. vacated in aid of settlement, 938 S.W. 2d 718
(Tex. 1997).
86. 645 S.W.2d 770 ('rex. 1982).
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condition precedent to the royalty interest vesting. It is vested at the time
of conveyance, not at the time the extant lease expires and a future lease is
executed."
E. Joint Operating Agreements
There are several circumstances where the Rule may apply to a
typical joint operating agreement (OA). One involves the provisions of a
JOA that allow a party to go non-consent. One way of structuring the nonconsent provision involves an express or implied conveyance of the carried
interest to the operating parties with a promise or covenant to reconvey the
interest after the well attains pay-out of both the production costs and the
non-consent penalty." The difficulty arises because the promise to reconvey the interest is specifically enforceable. Historically, where a contract
"raises an equitable right in property which the obligee can enforce in
chancery by a decree for specific performance, such equitable right is
subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities." 9 Since the well may never achieve
production sufficient to cover costs and the non-consent penalty, the
promise to reconvey would not be specifically enforceable unless it
occurred within the Rule's life in being plus twenty-one years. Rather than
treating this type of carried interest as a conveyance and a reconveynace,
Dean Kuntz would treat the arrangement as the creation of a valid charge
or lien on the carried party's interest.90
The second problem area for JOAs arises because typically an
option to purchase an interest in real property is subject to the Rule.' Most
JOAs contain a provision, commonly referred to as a "preferential right to
purchase" which gives each of the signatory parties the right to purchase
from another party, their interest in the property, if they want to sell or

87. The court in denying a motion for rehearing concluded: "There is no language
conditioning the effectiveness of the reservation upon an uncertain future event 'Since the
deed makes a present conveyance of the possibility of reverter, there is no violation of the
rule against perpetuities. In particular, the deed did not condition the effectiveness of the
grant on the expiration of the Coe lease.'" 924 S.W.2d at 175, citing Luckel v. White, 819
S.W.2d 459,464 (Tex. 1991). See also Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991).
88. EUGENE KUNTZ, THE LAW OF OiL AND GAs § 17.4 (1994) [hereinafter, "KuNTz, THE
LAW']. See also Eugene Kuntz, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Mineral Interests, 8
OKLA.L.REV. 183, 200 (1955).
89. GRAY RULE AGANST PE'RrumEs, supra note 1, at § 330.
90.

KuNTz RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrEs, THE LAW, supra note 88, at 527.

91. GRAY RULE AGAINSt PEPEriEs, supra note 1, at § 330. The application of the Rule
to options was clearly set forth in London & South Western R. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562
(1882)(which overruled Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D. 421 (1879)).
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convey that interest to a third party.' One early case that suggested that
certain types of options relating to oil and gas leases would fall outside of
the Rule was Weber. v.Texas Co.' The lessee was given the right to purchase
the lessor's royalty interest by matching the price offered by a third party.
The lessor asserted that since the lease could last indefinitely, so could the
option or preferential right to purchase. Notwithstanding the fact that
Texas has a constitutional prohibition against perpetuities," the court
concluded that the option was not invalidated by the Rule. The court
focused instead on the underlying objective of the Rule and the reason why
that objective would not be achieved by invalidating the option to purchase
the royalty interest. The court stated:
The underlying reason for and purpose of the rule is to avoid
fettering real property with future interests dependent upon
contingencies unduly remote which isolate the property and
exclude it from commerce and development for long periods
of time, thus working an indirect restraint upon alienation,
which is regarded at common law as a public evil.
The option under consideration is within neither the purpose of nor
the reason for the rule. This is not an exclusive option to the lessee to buy
at a fixed price which may be exercised at some remote time beyond the
limit of the Rule Against Perpetuities, meanwhile forestalling alienation. It
amounts to no more than a continuing and preferred right to buy at the
market price whenever the lessor desires to sell. This does not restrain free
alienation by the lessor. 5
Because the court analogized the specialized option to purchase in
Weber as a form of a preferential right to purchase, most early
commentators on the subject did not feel that the Rule would invalidate the
typical JOA preferential rights provision.'
But a 1967 decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court cast some
doubt on the wholesale exemption of these preferential purchase rights. In
Melcher v. Camp,' the parties executed two related instruments, the first

92. On preferential rights to purchase, see Harry M. Reasoner, Preferential Purchase
Rights in Oil and Gas Instruments, 46 TEx. L. REv. 57 (1967); Ryan M. Tew, Rights of First
Refusal: The 'Options' That are Not Options, But May Become Options, 10 EASrtN MIN'L L. INST.
PROc. 7-1 (1989).
93. 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936).
94. TEX.CONST. art. I, § 26 provides: "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the
genius of a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture
or entailments ever be enforced in the State."
95. 83 F.2d at 808.
96. See generally, Reasoner, supra note 92, at 57; John S. Sellingsloh, PreferentialPurchase
Rights, 11 ROcKY MTN.MIN. L. INSr. 35 (1966).
97. 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967).
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being a lease of the oil and gas above 5500 feet and the second giving the
lessee of the shallow rights an option to purchase a lease of the deep rights
should the lessor have any opportunity to lease such rights. The court
treated the option to lease as being triggered by a contingency which may
never occur, namely the receipt of an offer to lease the deep mineral rights.
Oklahoma has both constitutional and statutory provisions that adopt the
common law Rule." While admitting that the Rule does not apply to
personal contracts which do not create or transfer any right of property, it
does apply to contracts which create an interest in real property that may
be specifically enforced. Distinguishing Weber as an exception that has not
been widely followed, the court determines that the preferential rights
provision, much like its cousin the option to purchase, if exercisable for a
period of time longer than the Rule allows will be invalidated.
A federal district court in Oklahoma faced with the Medcher decision
reluctantly applied the Rule to invalidate the preferential rights provision
of a JOA." The court analyzed the problem as did the court in Weber, that
the objectives of the Rule would not be achieved by its application to the
JOA. The preferential rights provision does not fetter or clog alienation. It
is in widespread use and many persons have relied on that provision. But
because Melcher rejected those same arguments in an analogous situation
the court felt compelled to apply the Rule. The Oklahoma Supreme Court,
however, was able to extricate the JOA from Rule invalidation after the
Tenth Circuit certified a question to it after the district court's opinion was
appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the preferential rights
provision while analytically similar to the option, is functionally
distinguishable. An option is a classic Hohfeldian power. It gives the holder
of the option the power to purchase the interest subject to the option
regardless of the desires of the optionor. The preferential rights provision
while also a Hohfeldian power is a much more limited power. In order to
be exercised the optionor must first seek to sell the property interest to a
third party. If the optionor decides to sell then she must give the holder of
the preference right the power of first refusal. Alienation is thus not
hindered because the owner of the interest subject to the preference right
may choose to sell at any time. In addition the preference right only exists
as long as the JOA is in existence, which is as long as the underlying leases
survive. Thus a preference right limited to the duration of the underlying
leases does not violate the RuleY®

98.

OKLA. CoNsr., art. 2, § 32, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 31 (West 1994).

99. Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 437 F.Supp. 737 (E.D. OKLA. 1977), vacated and remanded
634 F.2d 487 (10th Cir. 1980) after certifying a question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 610
P.2d 772 (Okla. 1989).
100.

610 P.2d at 776 (citing Smith v. County of El Paso, 593 P.2d 979 (Colo. App. 1979)).
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In choosing between Weber and Melcher most courts have followed
Weber and refused to apply the Rule to preferential purchase rights
provision whether contained in a JOA or other instrument. 1 For example,
in El Paso ProductionCo. v. PWG Partnershipf'2 the New Mexico Supreme
Court construed an option to re-purchase a carried working interest as not
violating the Rule. The grantors had conveyed their working interest in
various federal oil and gas leases but had reserved the right to repurchase
the leases for a cash payment of $25,000. The option could be exercised after
a minimum of 30,000,000 MCF of gas was produced and upon the grantee
achieving 'pay-out' on the original wells. Many years later successors in
interest to the grantors argued that the repurchase right was not assignable
because if it was assignable it would violate the Rule."°
The court initially determined that the option to repurchase was
assignable. It then tackled the issue of whether the Rule was violated since
the conditions precedent to the exercise of the option were not certain to be
complied with during the Rule's life in being plus 21 year period. The court
identifies the purpose of the Rule as preventing the remote vesting of
° It follows Producers Oil in
contingent future interest in real property.'O
finding that options to purchase the reversion at the end of or during the life
of an underlying lease do not violate the Rule."0 The option to repurchase
in this case was likely to occur or fail to occur within a reasonable amount
of time giving the nature of reservoir dynamics. Where the option itself
does not have a time limit, the courts will construe the language to infer a
reasonable time limit or wait and see to determine if the interest will vest or
fail to vest within the Rule period. In this case, both the inferred time period
and the actual time for vesting would occur within the Rule period so that
the Rule would not invalidate the option to repurchase the working
interests.

101. See, e.g., Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. 1982) adopting
the rationale of the Court of Appeals, 623 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.App 1981) which found that a
preferential right to purchase did not violate the Rule. See also, Perritt Co. v. Mitchell, 663
S.W.2d 696 (rex. App. 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 258
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357 (Wyo. 1981).
102. 116 N.M. 583,866 P.2d 311 (1993).
103. The grantors were seeking to avoid various involuntary sales of the interests in
question which occurred because of the bankruptcy of one of the grantors. 866 P.2d at 31415.
104. See generally Gartley v. Ricketts, 760 P.2d 143, 145 (N.M. 1988); Cambridge Co. v.
East Slope Investment Corp., 700 P.2d 537, 540 (Colo. 1985).
105. The court also noted that New Mexico by statute has adopted both the 'wait and
see" and "cy pres" approaches to avoiding Rule problems. N.M. SrAT. ANN. § 45-2-901 (Repl.
Pamp. 1995).
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III. THE RULE AND TOP LEASES
A. Top Leases
Top leases have been defined as: "A lease granted by a landowner
during the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is to become
effective if and when the existing lease expires or is terminated.""06 They
have been used since the 1920s,'" notwithstanding the judicial statement
that they are akin to "claimjumping."f1 0 While there are two general
categories of top leases, it is the top lease that is given to a third party that
creates most of the problems. A top lease to the same lessee is, in effect,
merely a lease extension or amendment, which, if agreed to by the parties,
creates no Rule or other property problems.
The following were suggested as provisions that could be added to
a regular lease which would effectively create a top lease:
It is recognized by lessor and lessee that lessor, or lessor's
predecessor in interest, has heretofore executed an oil and gas
lease dated, (the prior lease), covering the lands described
herein. This lease is granted expressly subject to the existing
rights, if any, held by the lessee (or lessee's successor in
interest) under and by virtue of the prior lease.
This lease is made and entered into with the
understanding and agreement that this lease is subject to that
certain oil and gas lease dated, recorded in. This lease shall in
no event interfere with said prior lease and lessee shall have
no right of entry or possession for purposes of exercising
lessee's rights hereunder during such time and only as long
as such prior lease remains valid and subsisting under its
own terms (but not any renewal or extension thereof) as to
any lands covered hereby. Lessor represents and warrants
that lessor has not entered into any renewal or agreement to
renew said prior lease or amended said prior lease so as to
extend the primary term as set forth or recorded therein.

106. WmLuAM & MEYERS, supranote 15, at 1147. For other definitions, see Max Ernest, Top

Leasing-Legality v. Morality, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L INST. 957 (1980); Eugene A. Nabors, The
LouisianaMineral Servitude and Royalty Doctrines,25 TuL. L. REV. 485,493 (1951).
107. For cases where the court discusses the existence of a top lease see Gypsy Oil Co.
v. Marsh, 248 P. 329 (Okla. 1926); Rorex v. Karcher, 224 P. 696 (Okla. 1923); Texas Pacific
Coal & Oil Co. v. Patton, 238 S.W. 202 (Tex.Coamm'n App. 1922, judgrnt. adopted).
108. Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436,445, n.23 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364

U.S. 920 (190).
109. Earnest, supranote 106, at 975-76.
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Much of the language in these examples dealing with the delay in the
enjoyment of the possessory right is traceable to the threat of lawsuits
against top lessees by bottom lessees under a variety of legal theories.
One such theory involves the doctrine of obstruction." This
doctrine prohibits the lessor from asserting that the existing lease has
terminated or otherwise come to an end. One interpretation of a top lease
is that the lessor has made an election to terminate the bottom lease and
invest the top lessee with the possessory right."' Thus the language of the
top lease specifically denies the transfer of the present possessory right and
makes the top lease subject to the bottom lease. In many situations,
however, courts interpreted top leases as not constituting an obstruction of
title either because the language of the top lease did not create such an
obstruction or the bottom lessee has no actual or constructive knowledge of
the top lease.' The analogous doctrine of slander of title would also serve
as an impediment to the execution of a top lease, although the bottom lessee
would have to prove 'malice' in order to prevail." But an early decision
which found that a top lease which was taken 'subject to' the bottom lease4
did not act as a declaration that the bottom lease was forfeited,
undoubtedly influenced drafters of top leases to include such conditional
language, notwithstanding the potential problems such language may cause
under the Rule."' Today, top lessees need to be aware of the growth of the
common law tort of tortious interference with contract." 6 Basically a person
cannot intentionally interfere with a contract where that person is not a
contracting party."" The basic elements of the cause of action include the
existence of a contract (oil and gas lease), an intentional or willful
interference (executing a top lease) and actual damages proximately caused
by the interference.'

110. KUNTZ THE LAW, supra note 88, at § 26.14.
111. See, e.g., Robinson v. Continental Oil Co., 255 F. Supp. 61 (D.Kan. 1966); Simons v.
McDaniel, 7 P.2d 419 (Okla. 1932).
112. See, e.g., Bortz v. Norris, 226 N.W. 860 (Mich. 1929); Fike v. Riddle, 677 S.W.2d 722
(Tex. App. 1984).
113. Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S.W.2d 515 ('rex. Civ. App. 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
114. Henne v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 192,43 S.E. 147 (1903).
115. Michael Brown, Effect of Top Leases: Obstructionof Title and Related Considerations,30
BAYLOR L.REv. 213, 226-28 (1978).
116. For a general discussion of the tort as it is applied in Texas see R. Paul Yetter, From
Texaco to CBS: Ten Years of TortiousInterference Issues, 14TH ANNUAL ADv. OIL, GAS & MIN'L.
L. INST. Paper P (State Bar of Texas 1996).'The tortious interference cause of action is not a
recent development. See, e.g., Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443, 73 S.W. 800 (1904).
117. See, e.g., Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1995).
118. Yetter, supra note 116, at P-1.
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B. The Cases
It is somewhat surprising that given the long history of top leases,
that Rule questions did not appear earlier than they did. The first case to
discuss the problem directly was Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan.' 9
Plaintiffs were top lessees who brought a quiet title action against the
bottom lessees. Defendants argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge their title to the leasehold estate because the top lease violated the
Oklahoma Rule which is incorporated in their Constitution."' By judicial
decision, the constitutional provision is considered to have adopted the
common law Rule." But Oklahoma has, by statute, adopted the cy pres rule
as well as a rule to reform instruments that would otherwise violate the
Rule.' The language of the top leases in question said that they would
become effective on a particular date or one year "from and after the
expiration of the existing oil and gas lease, whichever is the later."" As to
the second of the time periods, the court concluded that it would violate the
rule in the absence of an attempt to reform the language of the top lease. It
was obvious that if the bottom lessee drilled a producing well within the
remaining period of the primary term, that well could produce for a period
in excess of a life in being plus twenty one years. Instead the court found
that it would give effect to as much of the second proviso as possible. It did
so by giving the top lessee not only the chance to possess the interest if the
bottom lease terminated by the fixed date, but also for a period of one year
following the fixed date. This gives the top lessee an opportunity to become
the possessory owner within a period that fits within the Rule. The court
also adopted a "wait and see" approach so that if the bottom lessee
commenced the drilling of a well so as to extend the bottom lease's primary
term, the top lessee would still have an interest in the event that the well
was completed as a dry hole within the one year period starting from the
fixed date.12

119. 417 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
120. OKLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 32 provides in part: "Perpetuities and monopolies are
contrary to the genius of free government, and shall never be allowed." An identical
provision is contained in the Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. I, 6 26.
121. Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967). See also Francis v. Superior Oil Co., 102
F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1939); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 345 F. Supp. 28 (W.D.

OKLA. 1972).
122. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 60, §§ 75-77.
123.

417 F.Supp. at 556.

124. Id. at 557. For an earlier case that is analogous to a top lease see Francis v. Superior
Oil Co., 102 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1972). In Francis the lease was to begin from the date the

"Ilessee may legally and peacefully enter upon and drill on said leased premises." Id. at 735.
At the time that the lease was executed a municipal ordinance prevented the lessee from
entering. The court, even in the absence of Rule savings statutes and doctrines, concluded
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The next shot across the bow of persons drafting top leases, was not
a top lease case, but a top royalty deed case, Peveto v. Starkey."2 Jones
conveyed a defeasible term royalty interest to Peveto that was to last for a
period of fifteen years and so long thereafter as oil and gas was produced
in paying quantities. Prior to the end of the 15 year fixed period Jones
conveyed the same fractional royalty interest to Starkey using the following
language: "This grant shall become effective only on the expiration of the
above described Royalty Deed... dated April 23, 1960. " 1 It was this
conditional language, much like the conditional language used in top leases
that triggers the concern about the Rule. Texas, like Oklahoma, has a
constitutional perpetuities provision which is the equivalent of the common
law Rule."2 The court had two options available to it. The first is to
invalidate the second top deed because it is a springing executory interest
which may not vest or fail to vest within a life in being plus 21 years if
production is occurring at the end of the fixed term. The second is to treat
the top deed as a conveyance of a portion of the grantor's possibility of
reverter that was retained after the original grant of the defeasible term
interest. The court chose the first interpretation based on the "effective only
upon" language of the deed. That was a postponing of the vesting of the
estate until such time as the first royalty interest expired. It was not the
present conveyance of a portion of a possibility of reverter. Thus the
executory interest in the second grantee is void.
The ramifications for top leases is evident. If a top lease uses
conditional language or otherwise states that it only takes effect upon the
termination of the bottom or base lease, the Peveto analysis would invalidate
the top lease as a springing executory interest that violates the Rule. Shortly
after Peveto was decided an Oklahoma court in dicta found that a top lease,
unless it expired at the end of the fixed primary term of the bottom lease,
would violate the Rule.28 But Peveto did not have the general effect of

that the lease did not violate the Rule because the parties were deemed to have limited the
onset of the lease to a reasonable time which would be much shorter than the period allowed
by the Rule. That kind of judicial bootstrapping is inconsistent with the policies underlying
the Rule, but consistent with the modem trend to construe instruments to avoid Rule
problems.
125. 645 P.2d 770 (Tex. 1982). Two casenotes on Peveto written within a year of the
decision raised the question of how it would affect the validity of top leases. Nelson Roach,
The Rule Against Perpetuities:The Validity of Oil and Gas Top Leases and Top Deeds in Texas after
Peveto v. Starkey, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 399 (1983); Ritchey, Top Royalty Deed Violates Rule
Against Perpetuities,14 Tx.TECH L. REv.651 (1983).
126. 645 S.W.2d at 771.
127. TEX. CONST.art I, § 26. Foshee v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 617 S.W.2d 675 (rex.
1981).
128. Siniard v. Davis, 678 P.2d 1197 (Okla. App. 1984)(released for publication by the
Court of Appeals).
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forcing courts to either follow the Rule or construe around Rule problems
when it came to top leases. Most courts continued to ignore the problem
and deal
with other matters relating to the construction and operation of top
12
leases. '
But in Hamman v. Bright & Co.,'-' the court applied the Peveto
rationale to invalidate a top lease while nonetheless stating that they were
not deciding "whether all top lease violate the rule against perpetuities." 31 '
The top leases contained the following language:
This lease shall be for a term... covering and embracing...,
ten (10) years after and subsequent to the forfeiture, or to the
expiration, of said [bottom leases] ...
It being particularly agreed and understood that during
the existence and continuance of said prior lease that the
rights, interests, estate, privileges and royalties, as fixed
thereby, of said Lessors shall remain vested in and held and
possessed by said Lessors, free of all claims and demands
whatsoever by [the top lessee] ...3
Again the choice was between treating the transfer as a present
(vested) conveyance of the lessor's possibility of reverter, or the transfer of
a springing executory interest. While acknowledging that the lessor owned
a possibility of reverter after the bottom leases, the court found that "under
the express language of these top leases, they did not make present
conveyances of their interests. Instead, the top leases conveyed interests that
would vest in the grantee only upon termination of the bottom leases...,
The court could have made a savings construction because the language of
the top lease is certainly not crystal clear that what is being postponed is the
vesting of the estate as opposed to the right of enjoyment of the estate.
There appears to be no express condition precedent to the top lessee's
interest becoming vested as might occur where the conditional language
was clearer making the grant itself effective only upon the termination or
forfeiture of the bottom lease. Nonetheless the court concluded that the
lessor had attempted to convey a springing executory interest which
violated the Rule and was therefore void. Thus the court followed the

129. See, e.g., Envirogas, Inc. v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., 120 Misc.2d 24, 465
N.Y.S.2d 141, affd, 98 App.Div.2d 119, 469 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1983); Stewart v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 604 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1979).
130. 924 S.W.2d 168 (rex. App. 1996), judg. vacated in aid of settlement, 938 S.W.2d 708
(rex. 1997).
131. 924 S.W.2d at 173 n.4.
132. 924 S.W.2d at 172. The bottom lease covered some 20,000 acres, although at the time
the top lease was executed to the son of the lessor, some 17,000 acres had been released.
Reply Brief of Henry Hamman to Applicationfor Writ of Error4 (on file with author).
133. 924 S.W.2d at 172-73.
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dictum in Siniard and the logical extension of Peveto to invalidate a top

lease.
Not every court has been so remorseless in their application of the
Rule to top leases. In Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co.,13 the effective date of the
top lease was to be "the date[s] upon which the existing lease terminates,
for whatever reason, and as to any or all of the lands contained therein. This
lease shall run for a term of three (3) years from said effective date subject
to the provisions contained in this lease.""~ In addition the top lease said
that it was to be subordinate to the bottom lease.
Notwithstanding the express condition that the bottom lease must
terminate, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the top lease did not
violate a North Dakota statute which invalidates a suspension of the power
of alienation for a period in excess of a life in being plus 21 years.13
Rejecting the dictum of Siniard, the court emphasizes the commercial utility
of top leasing and its widespread acceptance within the industry. Relying
on the Williams & Meyers principle that commercial transactions in oil and
gas should not be held hostage to the Rule, the court combines a wait and
see approach with a savings interpretation approach to uphold the validity
of the interests created by a top lease. Since the bottom leases in this case
expired at the end of their primary term, there would be no suspension of
alienation for a lengthy period of time. Thus the underlying policy of the
Rule and the statute would not be served by invalidating the top lease.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Rule Against Perpetuities, in its common law form, serves
important public policy objectives. Because oil and gas law has developed
as a sub-set of property law, some oil and gas transactions may run afoul
of the Rule. The use of top leases is one such area where the Rule and the
commercial practicalities of the oil and gas industry may collide. Should the
owner of the possibility of reverter be able to transfer the interest prior to
it becoming a possessory estate? Clearly the answer is yes. Should that same
owner be able to transfer something less than the complete possibility of
reverter? Again the answer should be yes. Should that owner be able to
ignore the limitations contained in the Rule, either intentionally or by
careless drafting? The answer is no. The certainty and security gained by

134. 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986). See also Forseth v. PrudentialTrust Co., [1960] S.C.R. 210,
21 D.L.R.2d 587, 30 W.W.R. 241 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1959) and Pan American Petroleum Corp. v.
Potapchuk,46 W.W.R. 237 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1964), app. dism'd. 51 W.W.R. 700 (Alta. Sup.Ct.
1964), app. dism'd., [19651 S.C.R. vi (Can. Sup. Ct. 1965) for two Canadian cases refusing to
apply the Rule to options to purchase leases upon the expiration of the base leases.
135. 382 N.W.2d at 657.
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27 (1987).
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applying property principles to oil and gas transactions should not be a hit
or miss proposition designed to avoid careful drafting and thoughtful
actions. The Rule does not create insurmountable impediments to oil and
gas transactions. Where it is applicable because the nature of the transaction
is one based on property principles, it should be applied. Where it is not
applicable either because the property interest created in not a contingent
future interest or because no property interest is involved it should be
ignored. Courts have largely shown the ability to discern where the Rule
should be applied and where it should be ignored. 37 The common law has
shown the resiliency to change to meet changing societal needs over the
past 1000 years. The Rule itself has changed in the past 300 years and
continues to evolve to meet current societal objectives. It should not be
thrown out based on the grounds of expediency. It should continue to
control those types of transactions which have the effect of "fettering"
property interests in a socially undesirable way.

137. For example, attempts to apply the Rule to the situation where an easement is
granted that allows the dominant tenement to lay additional pipeline in the future is
universally found not to involve the Rule. See, e.g., Kleinheider v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 528
P2d 837 (8th Cir. 1975); Caruthers v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 155 Pa. Super. 332, 38 A.2d
713 (1944); Williams v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 417 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See also
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947
(1955) (which rejects the application of the Rule to the pooling power created in an oil and
gas lease).

